July 2004
''This is a new article. As such is has been set to unassessed. Category:Content July 2004: 9/11 Commission Staffers Protest over ‘Whitewash’ of FBI’s Performance before Attacks, Win Minor Changes to Final Report 9/11 Commission staffers that looked at the FBI’s performance prior to the attacks are amazed when they read a draft of the report. The draft recommends almost no changes at the FBI and says that, regarding FBI reforms, “we defer to Director Mueller.” Several staffers go so far as to call this a “whitewash,” as they want an overhaul at the FBI, in particular of its counterterrorist operations. One of the staffers, Caroline Barnes, decides she has to appeal this to the commissioners. However, Executive Director Philip Zelikow does not like staffers talking to the commissioners directly (see March 2, 2003), so Barnes has to make contact with them in a place where Zelikow will not see it. She corners female commissioner Jamie Gorelick in the ladies’ room and tells her the staff are uncomfortable with what the report recommends about the FBI. Gorelick is concerned, and arranges for the whole of the team dealing with the FBI to brief the commissioners before the recommendations are approved. This leads to some minor changes in the final report. The phrase about deferring to the FBI director is edited out, and the commission calls on the bureau to promote the work of counterterrorist agents instead of treating them like second-class citizens. 2008, PP. 403-404 Entity Tags: Jamie Gorelick, 9/11 Commission, Caroline Barnes, Philip Zelikow Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: 9/11 Commission, Role of Philip Zelikow July 2004: Report on FBI’s 9/11 Failures Is Completed, But Remains Unreleased Until After Presidential Election In November 2002, as the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry was finishing its investigation, it had formally asked for a report by the Justice Department (which oversees the FBI) to determine “whether and to what extent personnel at all levels should be held accountable” for the failure to stop the 9/11 attacks. An identical request was made to the CIA (see June-November 2004). YORK TIMES, 9/14/2004 The Justice Department report, titled “A Review of the FBI’s Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks,” is completed this month. POST, 4/30/2005 It centers on three FBI failures before 9/11: the failure to follow up on the arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui in August 2001 (see August 16, 2001), the failure to follow up on FBI agent Ken Williams’ memo (see July 10, 2001) warning about Islamic militants training in US flight schools, and the FBI’s failure to follow up on many leads to hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar. The report provides some new details about miscommunications, inaction, and other problems. YORK TIMES, 9/14/2004 The report remains classified. Senior Senate Judiciary Committee members Patrick Leahy (D) and Charles Grassley ® call for its release. The senators state, “While the needs of national security must be weighed seriously, we fear the designation of information as classified, in some cases, serves to protect the executive branch against embarrassing revelations and full accountability. We hope that is not the case here.” TIMES, 7/12/2004; NEW YORK TIMES, 9/14/2004 One problem complicating the issuing of even a declassified version is the possibility that the material would taint the criminal proceedings against Zacarias Moussaoui. In early 2005, the Justice Department inspector general’s office will ask the judge presiding over Moussaoui’s case for permission to release a declassified version of the report. But the judge will turn down the request in April 2005, even after Moussaoui pleads guilty (see April 30, 2005). The report will finally be released in June 2005 without the section on Moussaoui (see June 9, 2005). YORK TIMES, 2/13/2005 Entity Tags: Ken Williams, Khalid Almihdhar, Charles Grassley, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Nawaf Alhazmi, US Department of Justice, Zacarias Moussaoui, Patrick J. Leahy Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline, 2004 Presidential Election Category Tags: Other 9/11 Investigations July-October 18, 2004: Spanish Informant Exposes Plot to Bomb High Court in Madrid Abdelkader Farssaoui, a.k.a. Cartagena, served as a government informant from late 2001 to June 2003, informing on a group of the Madrid train bombers (see September 2002-October 2003). He continued to work with Spanish authorities, and in July 2004, several months after the Madrid train bombings, he hears about a new Spanish bomb plot. He tells authorities that the plot is being led by a man named Mohamed Achraf, who is leading the effort despite being held in a prison in Switzterland on immigration violations. Achraf’s plan is to blow up the National Justice Building (Audiencia Nacional) in Madrid, using 500 kilos (1,100 lbs) of explosives. He is leading a criminal network and has been raising the money for the explosives through robbery and drug trafficking. He hopes that the bomb will kill judges Baltasar Garzon and Juan del Olmo, who are in charge of investigations against suspected al-Qaeda figures in Spain. He also hopes the destruction of the building will destroy many documents about Islamist militants in Spain. MUNDO (MADRID), 10/21/2004 Beginning on October 18, 2004, Spain arrests about 30 people who they accuse of involvement in the plot. Achraf will be extradited to Spain to stand trial with the others there. As of early 2008, no verdicts have been reached. 10/22/2004; BBC, 10/15/2007 Entity Tags: Juan del Olmo, Mohamed Achraf, Baltasar Garzon, Abdelkader Farssaoui Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Spain, 2004 Madrid Train Bombings Early July 2004: 9/11 Commission Executive Director Zelikow Tries to Prevent Formal Interviews of CIA Analysts who Drafted Presidential Daily Brief about Bin Laden Richard Ben-Veniste, a Democratic member of the 9/11 Commission, insists that the commission properly interview two CIA analysts who drafted an August 2001 Presidential Daily Brief (PDB) item entitled “Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US” (see August 6, 2001). Ben-Veniste makes the demand after he learns that Commission Executive Director Philip Zelikow interviewed one of the analysts by phone, but allegedly pressured the analyst to back the White House version of events (see June 2004). Initially, Ben-Veniste asks to see transcripts of interviews with the analysts. However, according to author Philip Shenon: “With a condescending tone that reflected his disdain for Ben-Veniste, Zelikow explained matter-of-factly that there weren’t any transcripts…. After months of battles with Zelikow, it was hard for Ben-Veniste to be shocked by almost anything he did. But the staff could see that Ben-Veniste was genuinely startled.” Ben-Veniste’s demand for full interviews is opposed by Zelikow, who says that one of the analysts, known only as Barbara S, has already been interviewed (although it is unclear how much of this interview was focused on the PDB). Zelikow will also say, “The CIA was pleading with us not to do this, since the career people involved in preparing and presenting PDBs would be intimidated, disrupting the sense of confidentiality and candor they considered essential for the PDB process.” However, when they are interviewed, the two analysts seem eager to volunteer the information they have. The commission’s Democratic Vice Chairman Lee Hamilton, who has a record of siding with the Republicans (see Before November 27, 2002 and March 2003-July 2004) fails to back Ben-Veniste before the full commission. Republican Chairman Tom Kean rescues him, pushing through the request for the interviews in the face of opposition from the other Republicans on the commission (see July 13, 2004). 2008, PP. 375-377 Entity Tags: Philip Shenon, ’Barbara S’, 9/11 Commission, Lee Hamilton, Thomas Kean, Richard Ben-Veniste Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Bush's Aug. 6, 2001 PDB, 9/11 Commission, Role of Philip Zelikow Between July 1 and July 17, 2004: Small Group of 9/11 Commission Staffers Spend Single Day at NSA, Do Not Have Time to Review All Relevant Material After 9/11 commission staffer Lorry Fenner discovers material apparently related to 9/11 in files made available to the commission by the NSA (see January 2004), a group of commission staff goes to the NSA to have a look at its archives. The group includes Fenner, as well as Lloyd Salvetti and Doug MacEachin, who have already looked at some of the material (see June 2004). The trip is at the weekend just before the commission is to complete its final report, and the group leaves Washington at 7:00 a.m. and stays “virtually all day.” They are given “huge piles of documents” to review. MacEachin will say: “There were stacks and stacks of paper. I was angry I hadn’t seen this before.” This appears to be the only trip made by the 9/11 Commission to the NSA to review documents and many NSA documents go unseen by the Commission. Author Philip Shenon will write: “the commission staff knew… perfectly well, was that the NSA archives almost certainly contained other vital information about al-Qaeda and its history. But there was no time left to search for it. director Philip Zelikow would later admit he too was worried that important classified information had never been reviewed at the NSA and elsewhere in the government before the 9/11 commission shut its doors, that critical evidence about bin Laden’s terrorist network sat buried in government files, unread to this day. By July 2004, it was just too late to keep digging.” 2008, PP. 373 Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, Doug MacEachin, Lloyd Salvetti, Lorry Fenner, National Security Agency Category Tags: Remote Surveillance, 9/11 Commission July 1, 2004: Tenet Says CIA Is ‘Increasingly Skeptical’ about Alleged Atta-Iraqi Agent Meeting In a statement to Congress on July 1, 2004, CIA Director George Tenet doubts that 9/11 hijacker Mohamed Atta met with an Iraqi agent in Prague in April 2001. He says, “Although we cannot rule it out, we are increasingly skeptical that such a meeting occurred.” He adds that Atta “would have been unlikely to undertake the substantial risk of contacting any Iraqi official” at such a date. YORK TIMES, 7/9/2004 Entity Tags: George J. Tenet Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion Category Tags: Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links July 2, 2004: CIA Director Tenet Fails Test Set by 9/11 Commission; They Doubt his Truthfulness The 9/11 Commission arranges for a final interview of CIA Director George Tenet. The Commission’s staff thinks of the interview as a “final test of Tenet’s credibility,” because they believe that both he and other CIA managers have not been telling them the full truth (see Before January 14, 2004 and January 22, 2004). In particular they want to ask him about a memorandum of notification that enabled the CIA to kill Osama bin Laden, but was not acted on (see December 24, 1998). What Memo? - When the Commission’s Executive Director Philip Zelikow says he wants to talk about the memo, Tenet, who spent a long time revising for his sessions with the Commission (see Before January 22, 2004), replies, “What are you referring to?” Zelikow explains about the memo, but Tenet says, “I’m not sure what we’re talking about.” He then says he remembers an early draft of the memo, which did not authorize the CIA to kill bin Laden. Zelikow explains that the draft Tenet is referring to is an early version of the memo, and that a later version, apparently requested by Tenet himself, allowed the CIA to kill bin Laden. Zelikow has not been able to bring the memo with him, because it is so highly classified, and Tenet still does not remember, saying, “Well, as I say, I don’t know what you’re talking about.” Disbelief - Author Philip Shenon will write: “Zelikow and staffer Alexis Albion looked at each other across the table in disbelief. It was the last straw with Tenet, the final bit of proof they needed to demonstrate that Tenet simply could not tell the truth to the Commission.” Zelikow will later say that he concluded Tenet’s memory lapses were not genuine, but that “George had decided not to share information on any topic unless we already had documentary proof, and then he would add as little as possible to the record.” False Denial - However, Tenet will deny this was the case, and say he could not remember the authorization to kill bin Laden because he had been on holiday when it was signed and transmitted to Afghanistan. 2008, PP. 359-360 However, the 9/11 Commission will state that this memo was “given to Tenet.” In addition, the 9/11 Commission Report calls the message in which the instructions were communicated to the assets in Afghanistan that were to kill bin Laden “CIA cable, message from the DCI.” DCI stands for director of central intelligence, Tenet’s official job title. Therefore, Tenet very probably did know about it. COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 132, 485 Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, George J. Tenet, Philip Zelikow, Central Intelligence Agency, Alexis Albion Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: 9/11 Commission, Role of Philip Zelikow July 3, 2004: London-based Islamist Approves Killing of British Troops in Iraq, Assassination of Prime Minister, but Authorities Take No Action Mohammed al-Massari. David Burges When asked whether British troops can properly be targeted in Iraq under British law, London-based Islamist Mohammed al-Massari replies, “British soldiers are reasonable targets for Iraqis and those joining the camp of the Iraqis.” Al-Massari, who runs the Committee for Defense of Legitimate Rights, adds that Prime Minister Tony Blair is a legitimate target: “Prime Minister is not a non-combatant. He is Tony Blair, the commander of the army.” Although it is an offence carrying a 10-year jail term to incite terrorism abroad, no action is apparently taken against al-Massari for these statements. 7/3/2004 Al-Massari helped set up a communications link for Osama bin Laden in the mid-1990s (see 1994) and ran a radio station and website that glorified Islamic extremist violence (see (2004 and After)). Entity Tags: Tony Blair, Mohammed al-Massari Category Tags: Londonistan - UK Counterterrorism July 6, 2004: FBI Translator Sibel Edmonds’ Whistleblower Lawsuit Is Dismissed Sibel Edmonds. Linda Spillers/ Getty US District Judge Reggie B. Walton, appointed by George W. Bush, dismisses Sibel Edmonds’ lawsuit (see June 2002) against the Justice Department, accepting the government’s argument that allowing the case to proceed would jeopardize national security PRESS, 7/6/2004; CNN, 7/7/2004 and infringe upon its October 2002 declaration (see October 18, 2002) that classified everything related to Edmonds’ case. Walton refuses to explain his ruling, insisting that to do so would expose sensitive secrets. “The Court finds that the plaintiff is unable to establish her First Amendment, Fifth Amendment, and Privacy Act claims without the disclosure of privileged information, nor would the defendants be able to defend against these claims without the same disclosures… the plaintiff’s case must be dismissed, albeit with great consternation, in the interests of national security,” Walton says in his ruling. 7/7/2004 Walton never heard evidence from Edmonds’ lawyers. PRESS, 7/6/2004; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 7/7/2004 Entity Tags: Reggie B. Walton, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Sibel Edmonds Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Sibel Edmonds, 9/11 Related Lawsuits July 8, 2004: Warning Issued that Terrorists May Plot to Disrupt US Presidential Elections Deforest B. Soaries Jr. MSNBC On July 6, John Kerry named John Edwards as his running mate. STONE, 9/21/2006 This produced a slight increase in the opinion polls and a media focus on the Kerry campaign. 6/4/2007 Two days later, Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge warns that “Al-Qaeda is moving forward with its plans to carry out a large-scale attack in the United States in an effort to disrupt our democratic process.” OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 7/8/2004 Officials cite “alarming” intelligence about a possible al-Qaeda strike inside the United States this fall and admit they are reviewing a proposal that could allow for the postponement of the November presidential election in the event of an attack. Officials point to the recent Madrid train bombings as an attempt by al-Qaeda to influence the political process in a democratic nation (see 7:37-7:42 a.m., March 11, 2004). Intercepted chatter leads one analyst to say, “they want to interfere with the elections.” It is reported that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) recently asked the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel to analyze the necessary legal steps that would permit the postponement of the election were an attack to take place. 7/19/2004 The head of the US Election Assistance Commission, Deforest B. Soaries Jr., confirms he has written to Tom Ridge to discuss this prospect. 6/4/2007 Soaries notes that, while a primary election in New York on September 11, 2001 was suspended by the State Board of Elections after the attacks, “the federal government has no agency that has the statutory authority to cancel and reschedule a federal election.” Soaries advises Ridge to seek emergency legislation from Congress that would grant such power to the DHS. DHS spokesman Brian Roehrkasse says, “We are reviewing the issue to determine what steps need to be taken to secure the election.” 7/19/2004 A top European spy says of the threat, “I am aware of no intelligence, nothing that shows there will be an attack before the US presidential election.” No attack will materialize and no further information on the threat will be presented to the public. STONE, 9/21/2006 Ridge will later concede that he had no “precise knowledge” of the attack he warned against, and he never made plans to raise the color-coded threat level. 2006, PP. 146 Entity Tags: US Election Assistance Commission, Deforest B. Soaries Jr., John Edwards, John Kerry, Tom Ridge, Brian Roehrkasse Timeline Tags: 2004 Presidential Election Category Tags: Terror Alerts, Internal US Security After 9/11 July 8, 2004: Magazine Correctly Predicts ‘July Surprise’ Al-Qaeda Arrest The Pakistani government is really desperate and wants to flush out bin Laden and his associates after the latest pressures from the US administration to deliver before the upcoming US elections.” Another source in the Pakistani Interior Ministry says, “The Musharraf government has a history of rescuing the Bush administration. They now want Musharraf to bail them out when they are facing hard times in the coming elections.” And another ISI source says that the Pakistanis “have been told at every level that apprehension or killing of HVTs before the election is an absolute must.” The Pakistanis have even been given a target date, according to the second ISI source: “The last ten days of July deadline has been given repeatedly by visitors to Islamabad and during director Lieutenant General Ehsan ul-Haq’s meetings in Washington.” The source says that a White House aide told ul-Haq last spring that “it would be best if the arrest or killing of any HVT were announced on twenty-six, twenty-seven, or twenty-eight July”—the first three days of the Democratic National Convention in Boston. One Pakistani general said recently, “If we don’t find these guys by the election, they are going to stick this whole nuclear mess to A. Q. Khan up our asshole.” The Bush administration apparently is using a carrot-and-stick approach to make sure such an arrest takes place on schedule. The New Republic observes, “Pushing Musharraf to go after al-Qaeda in the tribal areas may be a good idea despite the risks. But, if that is the case, it was a good idea in 2002 and 2003. Why the switch now? Top Pakistanis think they know: This year, the president’s reelection is at stake.” REPUBLIC, 7/29/2004 Pakistan will announce the capture of al-Qaeda leader Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani on July 29, just hours before Democratic presidential John Kerry’s acceptance speech at the Democratic National Convention. The authors of the New Republic article will claim vindication for their prediction (see July 25-29, 2004). Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, Pervez Musharraf, Mullah Omar, George J. Tenet, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, Abdul Qadeer Khan, Christina Rocca, John Kerry, Cofer Black, Ehsan ul-Haq, Colin Powell, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: 2004 Presidential Election Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics (July 8, 2004): Justice Department’s Inspector General Report Supports Sibel Edmonds’ Allegations Glenn A. Fine, the Justice Department’s inspector general, completes his report on Sibel Edmonds’ allegations (see Afternoon March 7, 2002). The 100-page report determines that “many of Edmonds’ core allegations relating to the co-worker Can Dickerson were supported by either documentary evidence or witnesses” and concludes that “the FBI did not, and still has not adequately investigated these allegations.” Additionally, Fine’s report concludes that Edmonds was fired because she was having a “disruptive effect,” which could be attributed to “Edmonds’ aggressive pursuit of her allegations of misconduct, which the FBI did not believe were supported and which it did not adequately investigate.” Fine adds, “As we described throughout our report, many of her allegations had basis in fact. We believe… that the FBI did not take them seriously enough, and that her allegations were, in fact, the most significant factor in the FBI’s decision to terminate her services.” The report is immediately classified by the FBI. Not even Edmonds is allowed to see the contents. An unclassified 37-page summary of the report will be released in January 2005. POST, 7/9/2004; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 7/30/2004; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 1/14/2005; CNN, 1/14/2005; NEW YORK TIMES, 1/15/2005; VANITY FAIR, 9/2005 Entity Tags: Melek Can Dickerson, Office of the Inspector General (DOJ), Sibel Edmonds, US Department of Justice, Glenn Fine Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Sibel Edmonds July 11, 2004: Saudi-Terrorist Link Continues? Senator Charles Schumer (D) claims that Saudi leaders and members of the Saudi royal family continue to fund Islamic militant schools and groups in the US. He calls on the Bush administration to cut US ties with Saudi Arabia, and says, “There’s been much too close a relationship between Saudi royal family, the White House, and big oil. We have to be much tougher with the Saudis.” PRESS, 7/11/2004 Entity Tags: Saudi Arabia, Bush administration, Charles Schumer Category Tags: Saudi Arabia July 12, 2004: 9/11 Commission Staff Meet with Navy Officer Involved with Able Danger Unit Ten days before the 9/11 Commission releases its final report, a senior member of its staff, Dietrich Snell, accompanied by another commission staff member, meets at one of the commission’s Washington, DC offices with a US Navy officer who worked with a US Army intelligence program called Able Danger, which had been tasked with assembling information about al-Qaeda networks around the world. This officer, Captain Scott Phillpott, tells them he saw an Able Danger document in 2000 that described Mohamed Atta as part of a Brooklyn al-Qaeda cell. He complains that this information about Atta, and information about other alleged members of the Brooklyn cell, was deleted from the document soon after he saw it, due to the concerns of Department of Defense lawyers. However, despite having this meeting with Phillpott, and having met previously with an Army intelligence officer who was also involved with Able Danger (see October 21, 2003), the 9/11 Commission makes no mention of the unit in their final report. The commissioners later claim that Phillpott’s information “does not mesh with other conclusions” they are drawing from their investigation. Consequently, the commission staff conclude “that the officer’s account is not sufficiently reliable to warrant revision of the report or further investigation.” Able Danger is not mentioned in their final report, they claim, because “the operation itself did not turn out to be historically significant.” PRESS, 8/11/2005; NEW YORK TIMES, 8/11/2005; THOMAS H. KEAN AND LEE H. HAMILTON, 8/12/2005 ; NEW YORK TIMES, 8/13/2005; WASHINGTON POST, 8/13/2005; NEW YORK TIMES, 8/22/2005 Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer additionally claims, “Captain Phillpott actually told the 9/11 Commission about the fact that Able Danger discovered information regarding the Cole attack.… There was information that Able Danger found that related to al-Qaeda planning an attack. That information unfortunately didn’t get anywhere either. So that is another clue that was given to the 9/11 Commission to say, hey, this Danger capability did some stuff, and they chose not to even look at that.” DOYLE SHOW, 9/20/2005 Entity Tags: Able Danger, Mohamed Atta, US Department of Defense, Al-Qaeda, Anthony Shaffer, Scott Phillpott, 9/11 Commission, Dietrich Snell Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Able Danger, 9/11 Commission July 12, 2004: 9/11 Commission Concludes There’s No Evidence Iraq Had 9/11 Role The 9/11 Commission publicly concludes that there was “no credible evidence that Iraq and al-Qaeda cooperated on attacks against the United States” and that repeated contacts between Iraq and al-Qaeda “do not appear to have resulted in a collaborative relationship.” It also again confirms that it does not believe the alleged April 2001 Prague meeting between Mohamed Atta and Iraqi diplomat Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani (see 1999) ever took place, a conclusion it had made in a public staff statement the month before (see June 16, 2004). YORK TIMES, 7/12/2004 Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion Category Tags: Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links, 9/11 Commission July 13, 2004: Al-Qaeda Computer Expert Arrested with Treasure Trove of Evidence Muhammad Naeem Noor Khan, a young Pakistani, is arrested in Lahore after six weeks of surveillance by Pakistani authorities in conjunction with US intelligence agencies. The US and Pakistanis learned of Noor Khan after arresting another al-Qaeda suspect, Musaad Aruchi, a month before (see June 12, 2004), and they had been tracking him since then. Noor Khan is taken to a high-security prison by Pakistani authorities, who resisted pressure from the CIA to let them completely handle the operation. 8/8/2004 American intelligence agents find what they later call a “treasure trove” of information in Noor Khan’s computers and documents. 8/2/2004 Khan is a communications hub of sorts for al-Qaeda. He is in frequent contact with dozens of other al-Qaeda terrorists around the world and passing messages back and forth from more senior al-Qaeda operatives. Former National Security Council official Gideon Rose will later say, “It is obviously a very serious victory. It is obvious that there is a real find here.” 8/8/2004 Khan, who speaks fluent English, is not just a center for expediting clandestine communications between al-Qaeda leaders and their underlings, but also handles and collates documents, reports, maps, and other information, and sometimes performs his own intelligence-gathering, usually on trips to Britain. 8/8/2004 Khan’s computer contains detailed surveillance information about five US buildings—the Stock Exchange and Citigroup’s headquarters in New York City, the Prudential building in Newark, and the International Monetary Fund and World Bank headquarters in Washington—all possible targets for future al-Qaeda attacks, though the information is all from 2000 and 2001. Other sites in New York City and San Francisco are mentioned, and meticulous information about London’s Heathrow Airport is also found. Pakistani intelligence officials believe that the information indicates a “present” threat, and so inform their US counterparts. Later in the month, the Pakistanis convince Khan to “turn,” or become a double agent. Khan will subsequently send e-mails to dozens of operatives all requesting that they contact him immediately (see July 24-25, 2004). 8/8/2004 Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Muhammad Naeem Noor Khan, Central Intelligence Agency, International Monetary Fund, Citigroup, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, Heathrow Airport, World Bank, New York Stock Exchange, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Prudential, Gideon Rose Category Tags: Counterterrorism Action After 9/11, Key Captures and Deaths, Other Possible Moles or Informants July 13, 2004: CIA Analysts Who Drafted August 2001 PDB about Bin Laden Tell 9/11 Commission Briefing Was Neither ‘Historical,’ Nor Ordered by Bush The 9/11 Commission interviews two CIA analysts who drafted an August 2001 Presidential Daily Briefing (PDB) item entitled “Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US” (see August 6, 2001). The interview is conducted mainly by commissioners Richard Ben-Veniste and Jim Thompson and follows an internal battle inside the Commission (see June 2004 and Early July 2004). Despite a claim by the Commission’s Executive Director Philip Zelikow that the analysts, known only as Barbara S and Dwayne D, were reluctant to answer questions, they are willing and eager to respond to Ben-Veniste. PDB Item Not 'Historical' - According to author Philip Shenon, the analysts are “confused” and “appalled” by claims by National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and others at the White House that the PDB item only contained an “historical” overview of domestic terrorism threats. The analysts say that this was not its purpose and that it was supposed to remind President Bush that al-Qaeda remained a dire threat in August 2001 and that a domestic attack was certainly a possibility. For example, the item referred to “patterns of suspicious activity in this country consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks.” Barbara S says, “That’s not historical,” and adds the threat of a domestic terror attack by al-Qaeda was thought “current and serious” at that time. Ordered up 'In-House' - In addition, the analysts say that another claim made by the White House, that President Bush specifically ordered the PDB (see April 13, 2004), is false. They state that the PDB item was ordered “in-house” by the CIA in the hope that the White House would pay more attention to the threat. However, President Bush had asked his intelligence briefers about the possibility of a domestic attack by terrorists that summer (see July 5, 2001). Zelikow Objects to Placement of Material in Final Report - Ben-Veniste insists that the material from the two analysts is placed prominently in the Commission’s final report, although Zelikow objects to this. After negotiations, the relevant paragraph will read as follows: “During the spring and summer of 2001, President Bush had on several occasions asked his briefers whether any of the threats pointed to the United States. Reflecting on these questions, the CIA decided to write a briefing article summarizing its understanding of this danger. Two CIA analysts involved in preparing this briefing article believed it represented an opportunity to communicate their view that the threat of a bin Laden attack in the United States remained both current and serious. The result was an article in the August 6 Presidential Daily Brief titled ‘Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US.’” 2008, PP. 377-379 Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, ’Barbara S’, 9/11 Commission, James Thompson, Richard Ben-Veniste, Philip Shenon, ’Dwayne D’ Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Bush's Aug. 6, 2001 PDB, 9/11 Commission, Role of Philip Zelikow Mid-July 2004: 9/11 Commission Staffers Worried about Impact of Newly Discovered Information about Iran on Political Situation After discovering information possibly linking Iran and Hezbollah to travel by the 9/11 hijackers in 2000 and early 2001 (see January-June 2004), the 9/11 Commission becomes worried about the impact the information might have on the current political situation. The material was discovered in NSA files late on in the commission’s investigation, as the commission initially paid little attention to the NSA (see Late 2002-July 2004 and Between July 1 and July 17, 2004). Commission staffers are worried because the information about the Iran links is not conclusive and the reports about it “might raise as many questions as they would answer.” In addition, they are aware that faulty intelligence had contributed to the decision to invade Iraq, and “the Bush administration seems eager to engage in saber rattling with Iran.” However, commission chairman Tom Kean comments on the Iran information in the press and these comments become headline news (see July 16, 2004). 2008, PP. 373 The relevant passages in the final report point out that apparent links between travel by the future 9/11 hijackers and Hezbollah officials could be a “coincidence” and that al-Qaeda detainees have stated the only reason for traveling through Iran was because it did not place telltale stamps in passports. In addition, the report says that there is “no evidence that Iran or Hezbollah was aware of the planning for what later became the 9/11 attack,” and that the “topic requires further investigation by the US government.” COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 240-1 Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, Hezbollah, Iran, National Security Agency Timeline Tags: 2004 Presidential Election Category Tags: Remote Surveillance, 9/11 Commission Mid-July 2004: White House Chief of Staff Likes 9/11 Commission Report, Thinks It Proves No Threat to Bush White House chief of staff Andy Card learns what the 9/11 Commission Report contains before it is published, as the various chapters are sent to the White House for classification review before the publication date. Card then hears back from the review teams. Despite fears about allegations made by former counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke (see March 21, 2004) and a key Presidential Daily Brief item (see August 6, 2001), in the words of author Philip Shenon, Card can see “that the Commission’s final report posed no threat to President Bush’s re-election.” This is because the report does not “single out individuals for blame. Certainly not George Bush.” The allegations by Clarke, related in a “he-said, she-said” manner in the report, also do not damage National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice. 2008, PP. 411 Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, Andrew Card Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: 9/11 Commission July 16, 2004: 9/11 Commission Chairman’s Comments Lead to Flurry of Reporting on Iran, None on Pakistan Shortly before the 9/11 Commission is due to release its final report (see July 22, 2004), Commission Chairman Thomas Kean says, “We believe.… that there were a lot more active contacts, frankly, al-Qaeda and Iran and with Pakistan than there were with Iraq.” 7/16/2004 This is based on a review of NSA material performed by one commission staffer (see January-June 2004) and a day trip to NSA headquarters by a group of staffers to examine material there (see Between July 1 and July 17, 2004). 2008, PP. 155-7, 370-373 The US media immediately runs prominent stories on the Commission’s evidence regarding Iran and nearly completely ignores evidence regarding Pakistan. The Commission’s final report mentions that around ten of the hijackers passed through Iran in late 2000 and early 2001. At least some Iranian officials turned a blind eye to the passage of al-Qaeda agents, but there was no evidence that the Iranian government had any foreknowledge or involvement in the 9/11 plot (see Mid-July 2004). 7/16/2004; REUTERS, 7/18/2004 In the wake of these findings, President Bush states of Iran, “As to direct connections with September 11, we’re digging into the facts to determine if there was one.” This puts Bush at odds with his own CIA, which has seen no Iran-9/11 ties. ANGELES TIMES, 7/20/2004 Bush has long considered Iran part of his “axis of evil,” and there has been talk of the US attacking or overthrowing the Iranian government. 7/18/2004 Provocative articles appear, such as one in the Daily Telegraph titled, “Now America Accuses Iran of Complicity in World Trade Center Attack.” TELEGRAPH, 7/18/2004 Yet, while this information on Iran makes front page news in most major newspapers, evidence of a much stronger connection between Pakistan and 9/11 is nearly completely ignored. For instance, only UPI reports on a document suggesting high-level Pakistani involvement in the 9/11 attacks that is revealed this same week. PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 7/22/2004 Furthermore, the 9/11 Commission’s final report will contain almost nothing on Pakistan’s ties to al-Qaeda, despite evidence given to the Commission that, according to one commissioner speaking to the Los Angeles Times, showed that Pakistan was “up to their eyeballs” in intrigue with al-Qaeda. ANGELES TIMES, 7/16/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004 Entity Tags: Thomas Kean, Pakistan, George W. Bush, Central Intelligence Agency, Iran, 9/11 Commission, Al-Qaeda Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline, 2004 Presidential Election Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Media, 9/11 Commission, Other Government-Militant Collusion Shortly before July 22, 2004: 9/11 Commission Debates Referring Military and Aviation Officials to Justice Department for Criminal Investigation Towards the end of its tenure, the ten members of the 9/11 Commission secretly meet to discuss whether military and aviation officials deliberately misled them and the public. For over two years following 9/11, NORAD and the FAA had given information in testimony and media appearances later found to be incorrect. Authorities claimed that America’s air defenses reacted quickly on 9/11, with fighters launched in response to the last two hijackings and ready to shoot down Flight 93 if it threatened Washington, DC. Yet audiotapes from the FAA and NORAD obtained by the commission under subpoena showed that the military never had any of the hijacked airliners in its sights and only became aware of Flight 93 after it crashed. John Farmer, a senior counsel to the commission, says the military’s original story was “a whole different order of magnitude than spin. It simply wasn’t true.” The commissioners debate whether to refer the matter to the Justice Department for criminal investigation, but as a compromise they instead refer it to the inspectors general for the Pentagon and the Transportation Department (which includes the FAA). The Pentagon inspector general’s office will issue a secret report to Congress in May 2005, blaming the inaccuracies partly on “inadequate forensic capabilities,” including poor log keeping at the military air traffic control centers (see May 27, 2005). However, Farmer and other commission staff will later point out that the military had already reviewed the NORAD audiotapes before its officials gave their inaccurate testimonies. The 9/11 Commission’s concerns over whether it was deliberately misled will only come to light in news reports in August 2006. Thomas Kean, its former chairman, will say, “We to this day don’t know why NORAD told us what they told us. It was just so far from the truth.” FAIR, 8/1/2006; WASHINGTON POST, 8/2/2006; NEW YORK TIMES, 8/5/2006 The Transportation Department’s inspector general’s office will issue its report in response to the commission’s referral in September 2006 (see September 1, 2006). Entity Tags: North American Aerospace Defense Command, John Farmer, 9/11 Commission, Federal Aviation Administration Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Other 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Commission July 19, 2004: News of Former National Security Adviser’s Document Theft Is Leaked to Press News of a document theft from the National Archives by Sandy Berger, a former national security adviser in the Clinton administration, is leaked to the press. Berger took copies of a document because he thought it might be used against either himself or Clinton, but was caught by archives staffers (see September 2, 2003 and October 2, 2003). He has been under investigation by the Justice Department for several months. The leak comes several days before the 9/11 Commission is due to publish its final report (see July 22, 2004), and the commissioners and their staff assume that that the news is leaked by the White House, because it is “eager to suggest that Berger’s acts had deprived the 9/11 Commission of information that might have embarrassed him and the Clinton administration.” Berger immediately steps down as an adviser to the campaign of Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry. 2008, PP. 413-414 Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, Sandy Berger Timeline Tags: 2004 Presidential Election Category Tags: 9/11 Commission Shortly Before July 22, 2004: Vice President Cheney Demands Changes to 9/11 Commission Report regarding Shootdown Order on 9/11 Vice President Dick Cheney is furious that the 9/11 Commission is going to conclude in its final report that it does not believe he has been telling the full truth about his actions on the morning of September 11, and tries to get the report rewritten on the eve of its release. Since late June, each completed chapter of the 9/11 Commission Report has been forwarded to the White House for a declassification review by a team of intelligence specialists assembled by White House chief of staff Andrew Card. According to author Philip Shenon, “Cheney and his counsel, David Addington, are outraged by the Commission’s timeline on Cheney’s actions on September 11—and the clear suggestion that Cheney had issued an unconstitutional shootdown order that morning without Bush’s knowledge or approval.” Members of the Commission’s staff had become convinced that the decision to authorize the military to shoot down threatening aircraft was made by Cheney alone, not by President Bush (see (Mid 2004)). A few days before the 9/11 Commission Report is to be released, an angry Cheney phones Thomas Kean, the chairman of the Commission. Cheney complains, “Governor, this is not true, just not fair.” He says he finds it startling that the Commission does not accept his word and that of President Bush: “The president has told you, I have told you, that the president issued the order. I was following his directions.” Cheney demands that the relevant sections of the report be rewritten. Kean promises that he will ask the Commission’s staff to review the material about the shootdown order again before the report is published. According to Shenon, “no major changes” are subsequently made in response to Cheney’s complaint. 2008, PP. 265 AND 411-412 The White House had previously successfully lobbied the Commission to water down one of its staff reports that dealt with the shootdown authorization (see June 15, 2004). 6/20/2004 Entity Tags: Thomas Kean, David S. Addington, Andrew Card, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, 9/11 Commission Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: 9/11 Commission July 22, 2004: Evidence the ISI Was ‘Fully Involved’ in the 9/11 Plot Is Ignored by 9/11 Commission UPI reports that the 9/11 Commission has been given a document from a high-level, publicly anonymous source claiming that the Pakistani “ISI was fully involved in devising and helping the entire plot.” The document blames Gen. Hamid Gul, a former ISI Director, as being a central participant in the plot. It notes that Gul is a self-avowed “admirer” of bin Laden. An anonymous, ranking CIA official says the CIA considers Gul to be “the most dangerous man” in Pakistan. A senior Pakistani political leader says, “I have reason to believe Hamid Gul was Osama bin Laden’s master planner.” The document further suggests that Pakistan’s appearance of fighting al-Qaeda is merely an elaborate charade, and top military and intelligence officials in Pakistan still closely sympathize with bin Laden’s ideology. PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 7/22/2004 However, the 9/11 Commission final report released a short time later will fail to mention any of this. COMMISSION, 7/24/2004 Entity Tags: Hamid Gul, Al-Qaeda, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, 9/11 Commission, Osama bin Laden Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, 9/11 Commission July 22, 2004: Saudi Embassy Says 9/11 Commission Report Exonerates Saudi Arabia The Saudi Embassy in Washington, DC, issues a press release highlighting portions of the 9/11 Commission Report favorable to Saudi Arabia. It quotes Prince Bandar as saying: “The 9/11 Commission has confirmed what we have been saying all along. The clear statements by this independent, bipartisan commission have debunked the myths that have cast fear and doubt over Saudi Arabia.” The press release quotes sections of the report saying that there was no evidence the Saudi government or top officials funded al-Qaeda, that flights for Saudis who left the US soon after 9/11 were handled professionally (see September 14-19, 2001), and that the Saudi government was opposed to al-Qaeda. EMBASSY OF SAUDI ARABIA, WASHINGTON, DC, 7/24/2004; SHENON, 2008, PP. 416-417 Sections of the draft report unfavorable to the Saudi government were deleted from the main text shortly before publication of the final report (see June 2004). Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, Bandar bin Sultan Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Bayoumi and Basnan Saudi Connection, 9/11 Commission, Saudi Arabia July 22, 2004: Prominent Figures See Ties Between the ISI, 9/11, and Even the CIA Michael Meacher, a British member of Parliament, and a cabinet minister in Tony Blair’s government until 2003, writes in the Guardian, “Significantly, Saeed Sheikh is… the man who, on the instructions of General Mahmood Ahmed, the then head of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), wired $100,000 before the 9/11 attacks to Mohamed Atta, the lead hijacker. It is extraordinary that neither Ahmed nor Sheikh have been charged and brought to trial on this count. Why not?” Daniel Ellsberg, the “Pentagon Papers” whistleblower during the Nixon presidency, states in the same article, “It seems to me quite plausible that Pakistan was quite involved in 9/11… To say Pakistan is, to me, to say CIA because… it’s hard to say that the ISI knew something that the CIA had no knowledge of.” 7/22/2004 Entity Tags: Saeed Sheikh, Mohamed Atta, Michael Meacher, Mahmood Ahmed, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Daniel Ellsberg, Central Intelligence Agency Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Other 9/11 Investigations, Saeed Sheikh, Mahmood Ahmed July 22, 2004: 9/11 Commission’s Final Report Is Released; Conclusions are ‘Gentle’ on Bush Administration The 9/11 Commission’s final report. 9/11 Commission The 9/11 Commission completes its work and releases its final report. They blame incompetence for the reason why the US government did not prevent the attack. The Washington Post summarizes the report, “The US government was utterly unprepared on Sept. 11, 2001, to protect the American people from al-Qaeda terrorists.” POST, 7/23/2004 The report itself states, “We believe the 9/11 attacks revealed four kinds of failures: in imagination, policy, capabilities, and management.” COMMISSION, 7/24/2004 The Washington Post reports, “Though openly dreaded for months by many Republicans and quietly feared by the White House, the report was much gentler on the Bush administration than they feared. Rather than focus criticism on the Bush administration, the commission spread the blame broadly and evenly across two administrations, the FBI, and Congress.” POST, 7/23/2004 More to the point, as former counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke notes in a New York Times editorial, “Honorable Commission, Toothless Report,” because the commission wanted a unanimous report from a bipartisan group, “it softened the edges and left it to the public to draw many conclusions.” YORK TIMES, 7/25/2004 The Washington Post comments, “In many respects, the panel’s work has been closer to the fact-finding, conspiracy-debunking Warren Commission of the mid-1960s, which investigated the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, than to the reform-oriented Church Commission, which exposed assassination plots and CIA abuses during the mid-1970s.” POST, 7/18/2004 Entity Tags: John F. Kennedy, Richard A. Clarke, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Al-Qaeda, Bush administration, Church Commission, 9/11 Commission, US Congress, Warren Commission Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline, 2004 Presidential Election Category Tags: 9/11 Commission July 22, 2004: 9/11 Commission Report Fails to Mention Possible ISI Connections to 9/11 Despite previous leaks to the media showing the 9/11 Commission was given information showing Pakistani officials were “up to their eyeballs” in collaboration with the Taliban and al-Qaeda before 9/11 (see June 20, 2004) ANGELES TIMES, 6/14/2004 , and even reports of a document given to the commission claiming the “ISI was fully involved in devising and helping the entire plot” (see July 22, 2004) PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 7/22/2004 , the 9/11 Commission’s Final Report released on this day rarely mentions the ISI at all. The only significant mention is a brief comment that the ISI was the Taliban’s “primary patron.” ISI Director Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed is mentioned only twice, both in the context of post-9/11 diplomacy. Saeed Sheikh is not mentioned at all. The report notes that details of the 9/11 plot were widely known by the Taliban leadership, but fails to consider if the Taliban shared that knowledge or involvement with their “primary patron.” COMMISSION, 7/24/2004 Indeed, far from criticizing Pakistan, the commission praises the country for its support in the war on terrorism, and suggests that the US should greatly increase its foreign aid there. PRESS, 7/22/2004 Entity Tags: Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Mahmood Ahmed, 9/11 Commission, Saeed Sheikh, Al-Qaeda, Taliban Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, 9/11 Commission July 22, 2004: 9/11 Commission Finds No 9/11 Insider Trading The 9/11 Commission dismisses allegations of insider trading in the days preceding 9/11, in a footnote contained in its final report. According to the report, the put options for the parent companies of United Airlines were placed by a “US-based institutional investor with no conceivable ties to al-Qaeda as part of a trading strategy that also included buying 115,000 shares of American on September 10.” With respect to the highly suspicious trading in the parent company of American Airlines, the Commission states that many of the trades were “traced to a specific US-based options trading newsletter, faxed to its subscribers on Sunday, September 9, which recommended these trades.” According to the Commission: “The SEC and the FBI, aided by other agencies and the securities industry, devoted enormous resources to investigating this issue, including securing the cooperation of many foreign governments. These investigators have found that the apparently suspicious consistently proved innocuous.” COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 499 Entity Tags: United Airlines, US Securities and Exchange Commission, 9/11 Commission, American Airlines, Al-Qaeda, Federal Bureau of Investigation Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Insider Trading/ Foreknowledge, 9/11 Commission July 24-25, 2004: Al-Qaeda Communications Node Is Turned, He Leads to Dozens of Operatives Around World On July 13, 2004, a young Pakistani al-Qaeda operative named Muhammad Naeem Noor Khan was arrested in Pakistan (see July 13, 2004). US intelligence agents find what they later call a “treasure trove” of information in Noor Khan’s computers and documents. 8/2/2004 They realize that Khan has served as a communications hub of sorts for al-Qaeda. He is in frequent contact with dozens of other al-Qaeda terrorists around the world and passing messages back and forth from more senior al-Qaeda operatives. Intelligence agents quickly realize that, through Khan, they can penetrate deep into the core of al-Qaeda’s current operations. Around the weekend of July 24-25, the Pakistanis convince Khan to “turn,” or become a double agent. Khan sends e-mails to dozens of activists in Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, and other countries. He requests that they contact him immediately and reveal where they are. As the emails come back, intelligence agents all over the world go into action to monitor those who have replied to Khan. 8/8/2004 Newsweek later reports that he sends e-mails to at least six contacts in the US, but the results of this are unknown. A senior US intelligence official confirms that Khan contacted people in the US, but believes number is less than six. 8/8/2004 Some of Khan’s contacts are quickly arrested, including Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, a Tanzanian wanted since 1998 for his role in the bombing of the US embassy in his home country (see July 25-29, 2004). 2006 Some communications take time to reach him. He is sometimes sent handwritten notes or computer discs from the mountains where bin Laden and other top leaders are hiding out. These are delivered by secretive relays of couriers who never see each other, using dead drops to avoid being traced. Other messages come from far-flung intermediaries who forward e-mail without knowing what it means, where it is going, or who is sending it. 8/8/2004 However, on August 1, Bush administration officials leak Noor Khan’s name to the press and the New York Times prints his name one day later. This only gives one week for the sting operation to work. Intelligence officials are crushed the operation has to end before it could expose many more al-Qaeda operatives (see August 2, 2004). Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Muhammad Naeem Noor Khan, Al-Qaeda Category Tags: Counterterrorism Action After 9/11, Other Possible Moles or Informants July 25, 2004: Iraq War Said to Be Crippling US Intelligence Operations around the World US News and World Report writes, “Since 9/11, the worldwide war on terrorism has stretched those officers the CIA thin, but the Iraq war is now putting them at a breaking point, say insiders.” Longtime CIA officer Jack Devine says, “The notion that you could support a military initiative in Iraq, combat worldwide terrorism, and cover other critical issues was wrong.” About a quarter of the CIA’s overseas staff is said to be in Iraq. One unnamed CIA officer says that CIA stations are “standing empty all over the world where there’s stuff to do. You’re either in Iraq, going to Iraq, or just back.” As a result, the CIA is turning more frequently to private contractors to make up shortfalls, including even in operational work. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 7/25/2004 Entity Tags: Jack Devine, Central Intelligence Agency Category Tags: Iraq War Impact on Counterterrorism, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics July 25-29, 2004: Al-Qaeda Suspect Arrested in Pakistan; Some Allege Announcement Is Timed for Political Effect Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani. FBI Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, a high-level al-Qaeda operative from Tanzania suspected of participating in the 1998 bombings of US embassies in East Africa, is captured in Gujrat, Pakistan, after a violent standoff with Pakistani police. 8/3/2004 Ghailani’s arrest is publicly announced on July 29, four days later. The announcement by Pakistan’s Interior Minister Faisal Hayat is made in an unusual late-night press conference that takes place just hours before John Kerry accepts the Democratic nomination for president. 8/17/2004 Pakistani authorities say the announcement of Ghailani’s arrest was delayed four days because of the need to confirm his identity before making the proclamation. 7/30/2004 But former Pakistani official Husain Haqqani later claims the announcement was timed to upstage the Kerry speech. 8/17/2004; UNITED STATES CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, 6/30/2005 An article in the New Republic published earlier in the month reported that the Bush administration was asking Pakistan to make high-profile arrests of al-Qaeda suspects during the Democratic National Convention in order to redirect US media attention from the nomination of John Kerry (see July 8, 2004). REPUBLIC, 7/29/2004 John Judis, who co-wrote the article predicting such an arrest, says the day after the arrest is announced, “Well, the latest development pretty much confirms what we wrote in the article, which is that there was pressure for Pakistan to produce a high-value target during the last 10 days of July and to announce that arrest.” He also asks why is it “they announced arrest at all? Because when you have somebody who’s been in hiding since 1998, they have an enormous amount of information and contacts. By announcing this guy’s arrest, what you do is you warn off everybody who’s been associated with him from the last five or six years. You tell them that they better get their act together or they are going to be found. So, there’s some, really a lot of questions of why they announced this thing when they did.… It may be in this case that we—that we, and the Pakistanis got somebody and prematurely announced this person’s arrest in order to have an electoral impact.” NOW!, 7/30/2004 Entity Tags: John Judis, Faisal Hayat, John Ashcroft, John Kerry, Husein Haqqani, George W. Bush, Al-Qaeda, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, 2004 Presidential Election Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11, Key Captures and Deaths July 29, 2004: FBI Letter Vindicates Many of Whistleblower Sibel Edmonds’ Allegations A letter by FBI Director Robert Mueller regarding FBI whistleblower Sibel Edmonds is leaked to the media. Edmonds has made some very serious allegations about the FBI, including claims of important missed 9/11 warnings and the existence of a foreign spy ring inside US government agencies. Mueller’s letter reveals that a highly classified Justice Department report on Edmonds has concluded that her allegations “were at least a contributing factor in why the FBI terminated her services.” This report also criticizes the FBI’s failure to adequately pursue her allegations of espionage. An anonymous official states that the report concludes that some of her allegations were shown to be true, others cannot be corroborated because of a lack of evidence, and none of her accusations were disproved. YORK TIMES, 7/29/2004 Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Sibel Edmonds, US Department of Justice, Robert S. Mueller III Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Sibel Edmonds July 30, 2004: Senator Mark Dayton Says NORAD and FAA Lied about 9/11 Failures Senator Mark Dayton. Publicity photo Senator Mark Dayton (D) charges that NORAD and the FAA have covered up “catastrophic failures” that left the nation vulnerable during the 9/11 hijackings. He says, “For almost three years now, NORAD officials and FAA officials have been able to hide their critical failures that left this country defenseless during two of the worst hours in our history.” He notes major discrepancies between various accounts and chronologies given by officials. He says NORAD officials “lied to the American people, they lied to Congress and they lied to your 9/11 Commission to create a false impression of competence, communication and protection of the American people.” He calls the FAA’s and NORAD’s failures “the most gross incompetence and dereliction of responsibility and negligence that I’ve ever, under those extreme circumstances, witnessed in the public sector.” He says that he grew upset about these failures after staying up late and reading the 9/11 Commission’s final report. (MINNEAPOLIS), 7/30/2004 Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, Federal Aviation Administration, Mark Dayton, North American Aerospace Defense Command Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: 9/11 Commission, US Government and 9/11 Criticism Late July 2004: Reporters Test US Airport Security by Successfully Shipping Uranium Through It ABC News tests US airport security by successfully shipping fifteen pounds of depleted uranium in a lead-lined steel pipe from the Jakarta, Indonesia, airport to Los Angeles. Indonesia is a hotbed of al-Qaeda and Islamist terrorist activity. It goes through successfully. The Department of Homeland Security, instead of re-examining its airport security protocols, will investigate ABC News and threaten criminal charges. 2004, PP. 16 Entity Tags: ABC News, US Department of Homeland Security Category Tags: Internal US Security After 9/11